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Abstract
We provide an evolutionary foundation to evidence that in some situations humans
maintain optimistic or pessimistic attitudes towards uncertainty and are ignorant to rel-
evant aspects of the environment. Players in strategic games face Knightian uncertainty
about opponents’ actions and maximize individually their Choquet expected utility. Our
Choquet expected utility model allows for both an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards
uncertainty as well as ignorance to strategic dependencies. An optimist (resp. pessimist)
overweights good (resp. bad) outcomes. A complete ignorant never reacts to opponents’
change of actions. With qualiﬁcations we show that optimistic (resp. pessimistic) complete
ignorance is evolutionary stable / yields a strategic advantage in submodular (resp. super-
modular) games with aggregate externalities. Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference
leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of games.
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The motivation for this work is twofold: First, we want to provide an evolutionary foundation
for why humans maintain in some situations an optimistic or pessimistic attitude towards un-
certainty and are ignorant to strategic aspects. This is closely related to the question about
when do optimism, pessimism and ignorance yield a strategic advantage. Second, on a more
theoretical level, we want to study how we can restrict by evolutionary arguments degrees of
freedom in models with Knightian uncertainty, ambiguity or imprecise beliefs. In particular,
we want to endogeneize by evolutionary arguments a player’s attitude towards Knightian un-
certainty as well as the amount of Knightian uncertainty over opponents’ actions in strategic
games.
In the literature on social psychology, there is evidence for biases in information processing
and their relation to “success”. For example, Seligman and Schulman (1986) found that more
optimistic health insurance agents sold more policies during the ﬁrst year of employment and
were less likely to quit. Cooper, Dunkelberg, and Woo (1988), using interviews, found that
self-assessed chances of new entrepreneurs’ success are uncorrelated with education, prior ex-
perience, and start-up capital, and are overly optimistic. Taylor and Brown (1988) found that
mentally healthy individuals maintain some unrealistic optimism whereas depressed individuals
have more accurate perceptions. Most studies focus on a positive bias in self-evaluations or
overconﬁdence in own skills and abilities (e.g. Svenson, 1981). This is perhaps distinct from a
systematic bias in judging the impact of uncertain events on one’s life. Studies on individual
decision making show that the majority of subjects shy away from uncertain prospects like in
the Ellsberg’s paradox (Ellsberg, 1961, for a survey see for example Camerer and Weber, 1992).
To summarize, there is evidence on optimism in psychology and evidence on pessimism in the
literature on individual decision making. This may suggest that both types of belief biases are
present in the majority of the population and are not stable across situations. An individual
may hold optimistic beliefs in some situations but pessimistic beliefs in some other situations.
We do not know of any experimental study that analyzes this hypothesis. In this article we
seek an evolutionary explanation and show that the bias may depend on the strategic situation.
We model Knightian uncertainty, ambiguity or imprecise beliefs by Choquet expected util-
ity theory (CEU). This concerns situations where probabilities may be unknown or imperfectly
known as opposed to a situations under risk where probabilities are known, a distinction made
by Knight (1921). In CEU the decision maker’s belief is represented by non-additive probabili-
ties so called capacities, i.e., probabilities that do not necessarily add up to one, see Schmeidler
(1989). Decision makers maximize the expected value of a utility function with respect to a
capacity, and the expectation is the Choquet integral (Choquet, 1953-54, Schmeidler, 1989).
Various axiomatizations of CEU have been presented such as by Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa
(1987) and Sarin and Wakker (1992). We make use of a parameterized version of CEU with
respect to neo-additive capacities (see Chatenauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant, 2005). This class
includes as special cases Subjective expected utility (SEU) as well as various preferences for de-
cision making under complete ignorance such as Minimax (Wald, 1951), Maximax, and Hurwicz
preferences (Hurwicz, 1951, Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972).
Since CEU is a generalization of conventional Subjective expected utility theory (SEU), it
has more degrees of freedom like the degrees of ignorance and degrees of optimism and pes-
simism deﬁned in the next section. It is natural to ask how to select among the degrees of
2optimism/pessimism and ignorance. A possible answer could be provided in an evolutionary
framework: If evolution chooses preferences parameterized by those degrees of freedom, which
one would it choose? To study such questions, we make use of the literature on Choquet ex-
pected utility in strategic games, in which players face Knigthian uncertainty about opponents’
actions (see for instance Dow and Werlang, 1994, Eichberger and Kelsey, 2000, 2002, Mari-
nacci, 2000, and Eichberger, Kelsey, and Schipper, 2005). Contrary to the major motivation
for Knightian uncertainty, according to which it is diﬃcult to assign probabilities to unfamil-
iar situations, we show that even after a very large number of repeated interactions implicitly
assumed to be behind evolution, players may be still have biased beliefs and are completely
ignorant.
Our work is directly related to the growing literature on the evolution of preferences (see
the special issue of the Journal of Economic Theory, 2001, and for example more recent work
by Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel, 2005) that started with G¨ uth and Yaari (1992) and G¨ uth
(1995). However, we employ Schaﬀer’s (1988, 1989) notion of evolutionary stability for ﬁnite
populations because we believe that in many situations of economic relevance, players “play
the ﬁeld”, i.e., all players in a ﬁnite set of players play a game. Schaﬀer’s notion also allows
for an interpretation as contest since it is closely related to relative proﬁt maximization (for
other applications of Schaﬀer’s notion see Shubik and Levitan, 1980, Hehenkamp, Leininger,
and Possajennikov, 2004, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). There are a few articles that study the
evolution of attitudes towards risk (Rubin and Paul, 1979, Karni and Schmeidler, 1986, Cooper,
1987, Sinn and Weichenrieder, 1993, Sinn, 2003, Robson, 1996a, 1996b, To, 1999, Dekel and
Scotchmer, 1999, W¨ arneryd, 2002) although in a very diﬀerent setting compared to ours. None
of those studies concerns strategic uncertainty. Most of those studies lend support for expected
utility theory. Robson (1996a) also considers an extension of his model in which non-expected
utility can evolve. A study which is probably most closely related to ours is Skaperdas (1991),
who studies the advantage of risk attitudes in a speciﬁc conﬂict game. We don’t know of any
study that considers the evolution of non-expected utility in a strategic context.
The classes of strategic games studied in this work are submodular games as well as su-
permodular games with aggregation and externalities. These classes include many prominent
examples in economics (see the discussion section). We can make use of results on monotone
comparative statics of optimal solutions of submodular or supermodular functions (see Topkis,
1998). Moreover, we can apply results on ﬁnite population evolutionary stability for submod-
ular and supermodular games with aggregation (Schipper, 2003, 2005, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania,
2005).
To illustrate the intuition for our results, consider for example a version of a Nash bargain-
ing game. Let there be two players who simultaneously demand a share of a ﬁxed pie. If the
demands sum up to less than 100% of the pie, then the pie is shared according to the demands.
Otherwise, players receive nothing. Let each player face Knightian uncertainty about the oppo-
nents’ demand. Suppose that a player is a pessimist. Then she overweights bad demands by the
opponent, i.e., she overweights large demands by the opponent. The more pessimistic the belief,
the lower is the best-response demand because the player fears the incompatibility of demands
resulting in zero payoﬀs. Could such pessimistic beliefs be evolutionary stable? Suppose the
opponent (the “mutant”) is not as pessimistic, then his best-response is a larger demand. If
demands add up to less than 100%, this opponent is strictly better oﬀ than the pessimist, oth-
erwise both get nothing and he is not worse oﬀ. Thus pessimism can’t be evolutionary stable.
3Is optimism evolution stable? Suppose the opponent is an extreme optimist in the sense that
he believes that the opponent will demand zero, then the best-response is to demand 100%. If
the opponent does indeed demand zero, the extreme optimist is strictly better oﬀ. Otherwise,
if the opponent does demand some strict positive share, then both receive nothing and the
extreme optimist is not worse oﬀ. Thus there is no preference with an attitude towards Knight-
ian uncertainty that would successfully invade a set of extremely optimistic players because an
optimist can not be made worse oﬀ relative to other players.
The example of the Nash bargaining game is also an example for the evolutionary stability
of complete ignorance. A completely ignorant player demands as if the opponent was not there.
The evolutionary stability of (to some degree) optimistic preferences with complete ignorance
holds with qualiﬁcations not only for the Nash bargaining game but for an entire class of games
characterized by a general notion of strategic substitutes, so called submodular games. Similarly,
we show that preferences reﬂecting extreme pessimism and complete ignorance are evolutionary
stable in games with some general notion of strategic complements, i.e., supermodular games.
Our contributions are as follows: To our knowledge, we present the ﬁrst study of the evolu-
tion of Choquet expected utility including Maximin, Maximax, Hurwicz preferences and Subjec-
tive expected utility in strategic contexts. Moreover, it is the ﬁrst study that tries to endogenize
the players’ attitudes towards Knightian uncertainty and ignorance towards strategic dependen-
cies in games. Hence we are able to select among equilibria of Knightian uncertainty. We show
with qualiﬁcations that a preference with optimism (resp. pessimism) and complete ignorance
is evolutionary stable in submodular (resp. supermodular) games with aggregate externalities.
Moreover, this evolutionary stable preference leads to Walrasian behavior in those classes of
games. Our results on the existence and monotone comparative statics of equilibrium under
Knightian uncertainty, that are helpful for deriving our results, may be of interest on its own
right since they are more general than what is known in the literature.
The article is organized as follows: In the next section we present some concepts that
turn out to be useful in the analysis. In section 3 we present strategic games with Knightian
uncertainty, deﬁne equilibrium and prove existence. This is followed by results on the monotone
comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to optimism/pessimism in section 4. Our main
results on evolutionary stable preferences are contained in section 5. We ﬁnish in section 6 with
a discussion, including a discussion on the irrelevance of the observability of preferences for our
results, the interpretation of our results as contests and potential applications. Some proofs are
collected in the appendix.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Orders
A partially ordered set hX,Di is a set X with a binary relation D that is reﬂexive, antisymmetric,
and transitive. The dual of a set X with a partial order D is the same set X with a partial
order D0 such that for x0,x00 ∈ X, x0 D0 x00 if and only if x00 D x0. A chain is a partially ordered
set that does not contain an unordered pair of elements, i.e., a totally or completely ordered
set. A lattice hX,Di is a partially ordered set in which each pair of elements x,y ∈ X has a
least upper bound (join) denoted by x ∨ y = supX{x,y} and a greatest lower bound (meet)
4denoted by x ∧ y = infX{x,y} contained in this set. A lattice hX,Di is complete if for every
nonempty Y ⊆ X, supX Y and infX Y exist in X. A sublattice Y of a lattice X is a subset
Y ⊆ X for which each pair of elements in Y the join and meet is contained in Y . A sublattice
Y of a lattice X is subcomplete if for each nonempty subset Y 0 ⊆ Y , supX(Y 0) and infX(Y 0)
exist and is contained in Y . The interval-topology on a lattice X is the topology for which each
closed set is either X, ∅, or of type {y ∈ X|x D y,y D z}. A lattice is complete if and only if
it is compact in its interval-topology (Frink, 1942, Birkhoﬀ, 1967, see Topkis, 1998, pp. 29).
We assume that all lattices are endowed with a topology ﬁner then the interval-topology, and
that all products of topological spaces are endowed with the product topology.1 For a lattice
hX,Di with A,B ⊆ X, B is higher than A if a ∈ A, b ∈ B implies that a∨b ∈ B and a∧b ∈ A
(strong set order). We then abuse notation and write B D A. A function (correspondence) f
from a partially ordered set X to a partially ordered set Y is increasing (decreasing) if x00 D x0
in X implies f(x00) D (E)f(x0). It is strictly increasing (decreasing) if we replace “D (E)” with
its non-reﬂexive part “B(C)” in the previous sentence.
Deﬁnition 1 (Supermodular) A real valued function on a lattice f : X −→ R is supermod-
ular in x on X if for all x,y ∈ X,
f(x) + f(y) ≤ f(x ∨ y) + f(x ∧ y). (1)
A real valued function on a lattice is submodular if −f is supermodular. A function that is
both supermodular and submodular is called a valuation.
Deﬁnition 2 (Increasing / Decreasing Diﬀerences) A real valued function f on a par-
tially ordered set X × T has increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in (x,t) on X × T if for all
x00 B x0 and t00 B t0,
f(x00,t0) − f(x0,t0) ≤ (≥)f(x00,t00) − f(x0,t00). (2)
If inequality (2) holds strictly then f has strictly increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences.
Functions deﬁned on a ﬁnite product of chains that have increasing diﬀerences on this
product are also supermodular on this product (Topkis, 1998, Corollary 2.6.1.). A familiar
characterization of increasing diﬀerences in many economic problems is as follows: If f : Rn −→
R is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable then f has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences on Rn if and
only if
∂2f(x)
∂xi∂xj ≥ (>)0 for all i 6= j and x. An analogous result holds for (strictly) decreasing
diﬀerences.
A few results will hold for a weaker ordinal version of increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences,
the (dual) single crossing property (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). A real valued function f on
a partially ordered set X × T satisﬁes the (dual) single crossing property in (x,t) on X × T if
for all x00 B x0 and t00 B t0,
f(x00,t0) ≥ f(x0,t0) ⇒ (⇐) f(x00,t00) ≥ f(x0,t00), (3)
f(x00,t0) > f(x0,t0) ⇒ (⇐) f(x00,t00) > f(x0,t00). (4)
1This is important later for existence of Equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty.
5We say that f satisﬁes the strict (dual) single crossing property in (x,t) on X × T if for all
x00 B x0 and t00 B t0,
f(x00,t0) ≥ f(x0,t0) ⇒ (⇐) f(x00,t00) > f(x0,t00). (5)
It is straight-forward to verify that increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences implies (dual) single
crossing property but not vice versa. The same holds for the strict versions.
2.2 Strategic Games with Ordered Actions
Let N be the ﬁnite set of players i = 1,...,n. Each player’s set of actions is a sublattice Ai of
a lattice X. We write An = ×i∈NAi, with a typical element being a ∈ An. Player i’s payoﬀ
function is πi : An −→ R. We denote by A−i = ×j∈N\{i}Aj. A typical element of A−i is a−i.
G = hN,(Ai),(πi)i denotes a strategic game (with lattice action space). A Nash equilibrium in




−i), for all ai ∈ Ai. (6)
Let E(G) ⊆ An denote the set of pure Nash equilibria of the game G.
A strategic game G is (strictly) supermodular if for each player i ∈ N the payoﬀ function
πi is supermodular in ai on Ai for each a−i ∈ A−i and has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in
(ai,a−i) on An. A strategic game G is (strictly) submodular if for each player i ∈ N the payoﬀ
function πi is (strictly) supermodular (!) in ai on Ai for each a−i ∈ A−i and has (strictly)
decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An.
A strategic game G has positive (negative) externalities if for each player i ∈ N the payoﬀ
πi(ai,a−i) is increasing (decreasing) in a−i on A−i for each ai ∈ Ai. A strategic game G has
strictly positive (negative) externalities if the strict versions hold.
Remark 1 Assume that A−i is a subcomplete sublattice of An for all i ∈ N. If G has
positive (negative) externalities then argmaxa−i∈A−i πi(ai,a−i) ⊇ supAn A−i (infAn A−i) and
argmina−i∈A−i πi(ai,a−i) ⊇ infAn A−i (supAn A−i) for all ai ∈ Ai.
In the following text we will assume that A−i is a subcomplete sublattice of An for all i ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 3 (Aggregative Game) A strategic game G with ordered action space is aggrega-
tive if there exists an aggregator ℵ : X × X −→ X such that
(i) Idempotence: ℵ1(ai) := ai for all ai ∈ Ai ⊆ X and all i ∈ N;
(ii) Induction: ℵk(a1,...,ak) = ℵ(ℵk−1(a1,...,ak−1),ak), for k = 2,...,n;
(iii) Symmetry: ℵk is symmetric for k = 1,...,n, i.e., ℵk(a1,...,ak) = ℵk(af(1),...,af(k)) for all
bijections f : {1,...,k} −→ {1,...,k}, for k = 1,...,n;
(iv) Order-preservation: ℵk is order-preserving for k = 1,...,n, i.e., if (a1,...,ak)E(a0
1,...,a0
k)
implies ℵk(a1,...,ak) E ℵk(a0
1,...,a0
k), for k = 1,...,n;
6and the payoﬀ function πi is deﬁned on Ai × X for all players i ∈ N.
This deﬁnition is similar to Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005). Aggregative games are also con-
sidered by Corch´ on (1994), Schipper (2003) and Cornes and Hartley (2005). Many games with
ordered action sets in the literature have the aggregation property. See discussion section for
examples.
Deﬁnition 4 (Aggregate Taking Strategy) An action a◦
i is an optimal Aggregate Taking
Strategy (ATS) if
πi(a◦
i,ℵn(a◦)) ≥ πi(ai,ℵn(a◦)), for all ai ∈ Ai. (7)
a◦
i is a strict ATS if the inequality holds strictly.
This notion is due to Possanjenikov (2002). Note that an ATS generalizes naturally the
competitive outcome or the Walrasian outcome in oligopoly games (see also Vega-Redondo,
1997, Schipper, 2003, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania (2005) provide a
straight-forward existence result for games satisfying a weaker ordinal property of increasing
diﬀerences, i.e., the single-crossing property, based on Topkis (1998), Milgrom and Shannon
(1994) and Tarski’s ﬁxed-point theorem.
We say that an aggregative game G is (strictly) supermodular if it is supermodular and for
each player i ∈ N the payoﬀ function πi has (strictly) increasing diﬀerences in (ai,ℵn(a)) on
Ai × X. An aggregative game G is (strictly) submodular if it is (strictly) submodular and for
each player i ∈ N the payoﬀ function πi has (strictly) decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,ℵn(a)) on
Ai × X.
We say that an aggregative game G has positive (resp. negative) aggregate externalities if
it has positive (negative) externalities and for each player i ∈ N the payoﬀ πi(ai,ℵn(a)) is
increasing (resp. decreasing) in ℵn(a) for each ai ∈ Ai. An aggregative game G has strict
positive (resp. negative) aggregate externalities if the strict versions hold.
Lemma 1 Let G = hN,(Ai),(πi)i be an aggregative strategic game, and let a◦ be a symmetric
ATS proﬁle and a∗ be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of G. If the aggregative game G is such
that πi satisﬁes
(i) the dual single crossing property in (ai,ℵn(a)) on Ai ×X and G has strict negative (resp.
positive) aggregate externalities, or
(ii) the strict dual single crossing property in (ai,ℵn(a)) on Ai ×X and G has negative (resp.
positive) aggregate externalities,
then a◦ D a∗ (resp. a◦ E a∗).
The proof is contained in the appendix. As a corollary, the lemma implies the result for
aggregative strict submodular games with aggregate externalities or aggregative submodular
games with strict aggregate externalities.
72.3 Optimism, Pessimism and Complete Ignorance
We model Knightian uncertainty by Choquet expected utility theory. Let Ω be a space of
mutually exclusive states and Σ be a corresponding sigma-algebra of events, then a capacity
is a function ν : Σ −→ R+ satisfying monotonicity, if E ⊆ F, E,F ∈ Σ then ν(F) ≥ ν(E),
and normalization, ν(Ω) = 1 and ν(∅) = 0. For simplicity and to set the stage for monotone
comparative statics, we model a decision maker’s ambiguous belief by a neo-additive capacity.
Deﬁnition 5 (Neo-additive capacity) A decision maker’s ambiguous belief is represented
by a neo-additive capacity νi(E) = αiδi + (1 − δi)µi(E), ∅ $ E $ Ω, νi(∅) = 0, νi(Ω) = 1, µi a
probability distribution on (Ω,Σ), and αi,δi ∈ [0,1].
Given that a player’s belief is represented by a neo-additive capacity, her (Choquet) ex-
pected utility from an action ai ∈ Ai is represented by the Choquet integral (for a proof see
Chatenauneuf, Eichberger, and Grant, 2005).
Lemma 2 (Choquet Integral) Let πi : Ai × Ω −→ R be player i’s payoﬀ function such that
♥i(ai) := maxω∈Ω πi(ai,ω) and zi(ai) := minω∈Ω πi(ai,ω) exist. Player i’s Choquet expected
utility from an action ai with respect to her neo-additive capacity νi is given by
ui(ai,νi) = δi[αi♥i(ai) + (1 − αi)zi(ai)] + (1 − δi)Eµi[πi(ai,ω)], (8)
with Eµi[πi(ai,ω)] being the expected payoﬀ with respect to the probability distribution µi on
(Ω,Σ).
Our particular parametrization of the neo-additive capacities allows us to diﬀerentiate be-
tween the amount of ambiguity δi faced by the decision maker i and her attitude towards this
ambiguity αi.2 We call the parameter δi the degree of ignorance whereas αi is the degree of
optimism. We often simply say that (αi,δi) is the preference of player i.
Deﬁnition 6 (Optimism, Pessimism and (Complete) Ignorance) Given a Choquet ex-
pected utility maximizer i with a neo-additive capacity, we interpret α0
i ≥ αi as α0
i being more
optimistic than αi (or αi being more pessimistic than α0
i) for a given δi. We interpret δ0
i ≥ δi
as δ0
i being more ignorant then δi for a given αi. We say that i is completely ignorant if δi = 1.
We say that i is a realist if δi = 0.3
Intuitively, a neo-additive capacity describes a situation in which the decision maker i has
an additive probability distribution µi over outcomes but also lacks conﬁdence in this belief.
2In the literature (e.g. Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper, 2005), neo-additive capacities are also presented by
νi(E) = λi + (1 − λi − γi)µi(E), ∅ $ E $ Ω, νi(∅) = 0, νi(Ω) = 1, µi a probability distribution on a state space
Ω, and λi,γi ∈ [0,1] such that 0 ≤ γi ≤ 1, 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 − γi. The Choquet integral is given by
ui(ai,νi) = λi♥i(ai) + γizi(ai) + (1 − γi − λi)Eµi[πi(ai,ω)] (9)
This is isomorph to the parametrization used here. I.e., we can set λi = αiδi and γi = (1 − αi)δi.
3Note that if δi = 0, then the parameter αi ∈ [0,1] can be arbitrary.
8She reacts to this ambiguity with overweighting good or bad outcomes. A decision maker
is optimistic (pessimistic) if she overweights good (bad) outcomes. The latter interpretation
is based on Wakker (2001) and justiﬁed in our context by Chatenauneuf, Eichberger, and
Grant (2005), who provide also an axiomatization of Choquet expected utility with neo-additive
capacities.
CEU with neo-additive capacities entails several familiar decision theoretic approaches as
special cases. Cases 1 to 3 concern decision making under complete ignorance.
1. If δi = 1 and αi = 0, preferences have the Minimax form and are extremely pessimistic
(Wald, 1951);
2. if δi = 1 and αi = 1, preferences have the Maximax form and exhibit a maximal degree
of optimism;
3. if δi = 1 and αi ∈ [0,1], these preferences coincide with the Hurwicz criterion, (see
Hurwicz, 1951, and Arrow and Hurwicz, 1972);
4. if δi = 0 and αi ∈ [0,1], the belief coincides with a conventional probability distribution.
In particular the capacity is additive, i.e., A,B ⊆ Ω, A∩B = ∅, νi(A∪B) = νi(A)+νi(B).
This is the case of Subjective expected utility (SEU).
3 Strategic Games with Optimism and Pessimism
A neo-additive capacity νi is deﬁned by αi, δi, and the additive probability distribution µi.
Since players in games face strategic uncertainty about opponents’ actions, µi represents a
probabilistic conjecture over opponents’ actions. This probability distribution is to be deter-
mined endogenously in equilibrium. In contrast, αi and δi will be treated exogenously for a
game. We focus here on equilibria in pure strategies only. Hence a player’s probability dis-
tribution over opponents’ actions is degenerate in the sense that it assigns unit probability to
one opponents’ action proﬁle. Therefore we write for player i’s Choquet expected payoﬀ from
an action ai given i’s belief ui(ai,a−i,αi,δi) = δi[αi♥(ai) + (1 − αi)z(ai)] + (1 − δi)πi(ai,a−i).
Set (α) = (α1,...,αn) and (δ) = (δ1,...,δn). Let G((α),(δ)) = hN,(Ai),(ui(αi,δi))i be a “per-
turbed” strategic game derived from G by replacing πi with ui(αi,δi) for all i ∈ N. Note that
G(0n,0n) = G.
Deﬁnition 7 (Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty) In a game G an Equilibrium
under Knightian uncertainty (EKU) a∗((α),(δ)) ∈ An with degrees of ignorance (δ) and degrees




−i,αi,δi), for all ai ∈ Ai. (10)
In the literature on Knightian uncertainty in strategic games, several solution concepts have
been suggested. In the discussion-section we will show that our solution implies notions by Dow
and Werlang (1994), Eichberger and Kelsey (2000) and Marinacci (2000).
(Strict) Supermodularity or submodularity of G is preserved under “perturbations” with
Knightian uncertainty as modelled by Choquet expected utility with neo-additive capacities.
9Lemma 3 If G is (strictly) supermodular then G((α),(δ)) is (strictly) supermodular for any
((α),(δ)) ∈ [0,1]n × [0,1]n. The analogous result holds for G being (strictly) submodular.
Proof. We need to show that if πi is supermodular in ai on Ai and has increasing (decreas-
ing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An then ui(αi,δi) is supermodular in ai on Ai and has increasing
(decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An for each (αi,δi) ∈ [0,1]2. If πi is supermodular in ai
on Ai and has increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An, then for any scalar γ ≥ 0
also γπi is supermodular in ai on Ai and has increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i)
on An (Topkis, 1998, Lemma 2.6.1. (a)). ♥i and zi are both supermodular in ai on Ai by
deﬁnition and constant in a−i on A−i. Since ui is for each (αi,βi) ∈ [0,1]2 a sum of super-
modular functions in ai on Ai having increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An, it is
supermodular in ai on Ai and has increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences (ai,a−i) on An (Topkis,
1998, Lemma 2.6.1. (b)). By analogous arguments, the result extends to the strict versions
(see Topkis, 1998, p. 49). 
Often the literature makes use of weaker ordinal notions of supermodularity. Those notions
may not appropriate for our model as following remark asserts.
Remark 2 The ordinal version of supermodularity, quasisupermodularity (see Milgrom and
Shannon, 1994), may not need to be preserved under Knightian uncertainty since the sum of
two quasisupermodular functions does not need to be quasisupermodular unless either is super-
modular (Topkis, 1998, pp. 62). An analogous conclusion holds for functions satisfying the
ordinal version of increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences called (dual) single crossing property (see
Milgrom and Shannon, 1994).
Given the game G((α),(β)), let player i’s best response correspondence be deﬁned by
bi(a−i,αi,δi) := {ai ∈ Ai : ui(ai,a−i,αi,δi) ≥ ui(a0
i,a−i,αi,δi),∀a0
i ∈ Ai}. (11)
Lemma 4 If G is supermodular (submodular) then for any i ∈ N and any (αi,δi) ∈ [0,1]2, the
best response bi(a−i,αi,δi) is a sublattice of Ai and increasing (decreasing) in a−i on {a−i ∈
A−i : bi(a−i,αi,δi) 6= ∅}.
Proof. By Lemma 3, if G is supermodular (submodular), then G((α),(δ)) is supermodu-
lar (submodular) for each (α,δ) ∈ [0,1]n × [0,1]n. Thus ui is supermodular in ai on Ai and
has increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An. Since ui is supermodular in ai on Ai,
bi(a−i,αi,δi) is a sublattice of Ai for each a−i ∈ A−i and (αi,δi) ∈ [0,1]×[0,1] by Topkis (1998),
Theorem 2.7.1. Since ui has increasing (decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An, bi(a−i,αi,δi)
is increasing (decreasing) in a−i on {a−i ∈ A−i : bi(a−i,αi,δi) 6= ∅} by Topkis (1998), Theorem
2.8.1. 
If the Hurwicz criterion is satisﬁed, i.e., the player is completely ignorant, then her objective
function does not depend on the opponents’ actions. This leads to the following observation:
Remark 3 If δi = 1, then bi(a−i,αi,1) is trivially constant in a−i on A−i for any αi ∈ [0,1].
10We are able state general results on the existence of equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty.
Proposition 1 (Existence in Supermodular Games) If G is supermodular and for all i ∈
N, Ai is a non-empty complete lattice, and πi is upper semicontinuous on Ai, then for any
((α),(δ)) ∈ [0,1]n×[0,1]n the set of equilibria under Knightian uncertainty is a complete lattice
and a greatest and least equilibrium exist.
Proof. Note that if πi is upper semicontinuous on Ai then ui is upper semicontinuous on Ai
since limits are preserved under algebraic operations. The result follows then from Lemmata 3
and 4 and Zhou’s (1994) generalization of Tarski’s ﬁxed point theorem. 
Note that in Proposition 1 we do not claim that the set of equilibria under Knightian
uncertainty is a sublattice of An. Thus if a = (a1,...,an) and a0 = (a0
1,...,a0
n) are both equilibria
under Knightian uncertainty for G((α),(δ)) then (a1 ∨ a0
1,...,an ∨ a0
n) and (a1 ∧ a0
1,...,an ∧ a0
n)
may not be equilibria under Knightian uncertainty for the game G((α),(δ)) (see for an example
Zhou (1994), p. 299).
Remark 4 If G is supermodular with n = 2, Ai is a non-empty complete chain, and πi is upper
semicontinuous on Ai for i = 1,2, then for any ((α),(δ)) ∈ [0,1]n × [0,1]n the set of equilibria
under Knightian uncertainty is a subcomplete sublattice and a greatest and least equilibrium
exist.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 1 and a result by Echenique (2003) who observed that
the set of Nash equilibria forms a sublattice in two-player games with totally ordered action
sets and for which each player’s best response correspondence is increasing in the strong set
order (e.g. supermodular games). 
Since there is no general ﬁxed-point theorem applicable to decreasing best responses, we
use a diﬀerent approach to existence in submodular games based on Kukushkin (1994) and
Novshek (1985).
Proposition 2 (Existence in Submodular Games) If G is submodular and for all i ∈ N,
Ai is a non-empty compact subset of R+, πi is deﬁned on Ai and the range of sums of opponents
actions, and is continuous in both variables, then for any ((α),(δ)) ∈ [0,1]n × [0,1]n the set of
equilibria under Knightian uncertainty is non-empty.
Proof. Submodularity of G implies by Lemma 3 submodularity of G((α),(δ)) for all (α,δ) ∈
[0,1]n × [0,1]n. Thus for all i ∈ N, ui(αi,δi) has decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,
P
j∈N\{i} aj).
By Lemma 4, bi(αi,δi) is decreasing in
P
j∈N\{i} aj. Since πi is continuous in both variables,
ui(αi,δi) is continuous in ai and
P
j∈N\{j} aj because limits are preserved under algebraic op-
erations. Thus bi(
P
j∈N\{i} aj,αi,δi) is non-empty for any
P
j∈N\{i} aj. It also implies that
bi(αi,δi) is upper-hemicontinuous in
P
j∈N\{i} aj. Thus the conditions are suﬃcient for a theo-
rem by Kukushkin (1994) by which there exists a Nash equilibrium in pure actions of the game
G((α),(δ)). 
11Kukushkin (1994) requires for each player a real-valued compact action set, an upper hemi-
continuous best response correspondence with a single-valued selection that is decreasing in the
additive aggregate of opponents’ actions. Last assumption is slightly weaker than decreasing
best responses in the additive aggregate of opponents’ actions that result from decreasing dif-
ferences of the Choquet expected payoﬀs in (ai,a−i) on An in our case. The pseudo-potential
approach to existence by Dubey, Haimanko and Zapechelnyuk (2004) would be an alternative
to Kukushkin (1994). This approach could be used for games both with increasing and decreas-
ing best responses. Note also that Proposition 1 could be applied for existence in two-player
submodular games in which action sets are chains by replacing one player’s ordered action set
with the dual. This transforms the game into a two-player supermodular game.
In the later analysis, complete ignorance will play a prominent role. For this special case, no
matter whether the game is supermodular or submodular, existence and uniqueness is rather
straight-forward.
Proposition 3 (Existence under Complete Ignorance) Let G = hN,(Ai),(πi)i be a strate-
gic game with for all i ∈ N, Ai being a non-empty complete lattice, πi being upper semincontin-
uous and supermodular on Ai for all i ∈ N, and the Hurwicz criterion is satisﬁed (i.e., δi = 1
for all i ∈ N). Then for all (α) ∈ [0,1]n, the set of equilibria under Knightian uncertainty is a
complete lattice and a greatest and least equilibrium exist.
Proof. By Remark 3, if for all i ∈ N, δi = 1, then bi(a−i,αi,1) is trivially constant in a−i
on A−i for any αi ∈ [0,1] for all i ∈ N. Hence bi(a−i,αi,1) is trivially increasing in a−i on A−i
for any αi ∈ [0,1] for all i ∈ N. Note that if πi is upper semicontinuous on Ai, then ui is upper
semicontinuous on Ai since limits are preserved under algebraic operations. Note further that
if πi supermodular in ai on Ai, then by the proof of Lemma 3 ui is supermodular in ai on Ai.
The result follows then from Zhou’s (1994) generalization of Tarski’s ﬁxed-point theorem. 
While there is a direct alternative elementary proof for above proposition, we choose to
present the proof as a special case for Nash equilibrium for games with increasing best-response
correspondence (Zhou, 1994) in order to point out the connection to previous results.
Proposition 4 (Uniqueness under Complete Ignorance) Let G = hN,(Ai),(πi)i be a
strategic game with for all i ∈ N, πi being strictly concave on Ai and the Hurwicz criterion
being satisﬁed (i.e., δi = 1). If there exists an equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty then it
is unique and each player’s equilibrium action is her dominant action.
Proof. If πi is strictly concave, then ui is strictly concave since it is a weighted sum of
strictly concave functions. Strict concavity of ui is suﬃcient for bi(a−i,αi,1) being unique for
all a−i ∈ A−i, αi ∈ [0,1]. By Remark 3, if δi = 1 then bi(a−i,αi,1) is constant for all a−i ∈ A−i,
αi ∈ [0,1]. Hence, if there exists an equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty with δi = 1 for
all i ∈ N, then it must be unique with each player choosing her unique dominant action. 
Finally, we like to remark that Vives (2000, Theorem 2.8, Remark 17) shows the following
observation: Consider a symmetric submodular game. If the slope of any selection of the best-
response correspondence is strictly greater −1 then if there exists an equilibrium, it must be
unique and symmetric.
124 Monotone Comparative Statics
To analyze the eﬀect of mutants in equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty, it will be helpful
to study ﬁrst the monotone comparative statics of equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty.
Given the level of generality, these results may be of interest for their own right.
Lemma 5 If πi has [increasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and positive (resp. negative)
externalities] or [decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and negative (resp. positive) exter-
nalities] then ui has increasing (resp. decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,αi) on Ai × [0,1] for all
a−i ∈ A−i and δi ∈ [0,1]. The result extends to the strict versions.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Lemma 6 (Monotone Optimal Selections) If ui(ai,a−i,αi,δi) is supermodular in ai on
Ai and has increasing (resp. decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,αi) on Ai × [0,1] for each a−i ∈
A−i and δi ∈ [0,1], then bi(a−i,αi,δi) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in αi on {αi ∈ [0,1] :
bi(a−i,αi,δi) 6= ∅} for δi ∈ [0,1]. If in addition ui(ai,a−i,αi,δi) has strictly increasing (resp.
decreasing) diﬀerences in (ai,αi) on Ai × [0,1] for each a−i ∈ A−i and δi ∈ [0,1], α00
i > α0
i in




i ,δi), then a0
i E (D)a00
i . In
this case, if one picks any ai(αi) in bi(a−i,αi,δi) for each αi with bi(a−i,αi,δi) nonempty, then
ai(αi) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in αi on {αi ∈ [0,1] : bi(a−i,αi,δi) 6= ∅}.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Corollary 1 If πi is supermodular in ai on Ai, has increasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and
has positive (resp. negative) externalities, then bi(a−i,αi,δi) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in
αi on {αi ∈ [0,1] : bi(a−i,αi,δi) 6= ∅} for each δi ∈ [0,1]. The same comparative statics obtains
if πi has decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and negative (resp. positive) externalities. If πi
has strictly increasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and positive (resp. negative) externalities,
α00
i > α0





i ,δi), then a0
i E(D)a00
i . In this case, if one picks any ai(αi) in bi(a−i,αi,δi) for each αi
with bi(a−i,αi,δi) nonempty, then ai(αi) is increasing (resp. decreasing) in αi on {αi ∈ [0,1] :
bi(a−i,αi) 6= ∅}. The same comparative statics obtains if πi has strictly decreasing diﬀerences
in (ai,a−i) on An and negative (resp. positive) externalities.
Proposition 5 (Mon. Comp. Statics - Supermodularity) If G is a supermodular game
with positive (resp. negative) externalities, then the greatest and least equilibrium under Knight-
ian uncertainty is increasing (resp. decreasing) in optimism (and decreasing (resp. increasing)
in pessimism).
Proof. This follows from previous results and Topkis (1998, Theorem 4.2.2). 
As usual in the literature, there is no dual result for submodular games. However, if the
Hurwicz criterion is satisﬁed (i.e., under complete ignorance), then we can derive a dual but
more special result for submodular games with externalities.
13Proposition 6 (Mon. Comp. Statics - Submodularity and Complete Ignorance) If
G is a submodular game with negative (resp. positive) externalities and the Hurwicz criterion
(δi = 1) is satisﬁed for all players i ∈ N, then the greatest and least equilibrium under Knightian
uncertainty is increasing (resp. decreasing) in optimism (and decreasing (resp. increasing) in
pessimism).
Proof. Let G be a submodular game with negative externalities and (δ) = 1n, and con-
sider the greatest equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty ¯ a(α) when the proﬁle of degrees of
optimism is (α). Let (α0) ≥ (α). Suppose now to the contrary that the greatest equilibrium
under Knightian uncertainty ¯ a(α0) is smaller or unordered to ¯ a(α). In both cases there exist
a player i whose equilibrium actions satisfy ¯ ai(α0) is strictly smaller or unordered to ¯ ai(α).
Note that ¯ ai(α0) ∈ bi(¯ a−i(α0),α0
i,1) and ¯ ai(α) ∈ bi(¯ a−i(α),αi,1). Since δi = 1, bi is constant
in a−i by Remark 3. Hence, bi(¯ a−i(α),αi,1) 6= bi(¯ a−i(α0),α0
i,1) only if (α) 6= (α0). By Corol-
lary 1, bi(¯ a−i(α),αi,1) is increasing in αi. Hence there exists ˜ ai(α0) ∈ bi(a−i(α0),α0
i,1) with
˜ ai(α0) ≥ ¯ ai(α), a contradiction to ¯ ai(α0) being a component of the greatest equilibrium under
Knightian uncertainty with (α0) and (δ) = 1n. An analogous arguments holds for positive
externalities and for the least equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty. 
5 Evolutionary Stable Preferences
We will restrict the analysis to symmetric games. That is, we assume for all i ∈ N, πi = π,
Ai = A, and π(ai,a−i) = π(ai,a0
−i) if a0
−i is a permutation of a−i. Note that symmetry of G
implies ♥i = ♥ and zi = z. Furthermore, we assume that each player’s set of actions A is
a chain. This assumption is done in light of our results on the monotone comparative statics.
We do not know how to assess the equilibrium payoﬀ of a mutant playing an action unordered
to an non-mutant’s action.
Denote by TG an arbitrary collection of any player’s preferences that can possibly be deﬁned
in a game form hN,Ai of the strategic game G = hN,A,πi. For instance, we could parameterize
player i’s Choquet expected utility functions over outcomes in the game G with respect to neo-
additive capacities by ti = (αi,βi) ∈ TG = [0,1]2 but we want to allow for a much more general
set of preferences including preferences over other players’ payoﬀs, beliefs etc. For our results
in this section, we only require that TG includes some speciﬁc form of Choquet expected utility
functions over outcomes in the strategic game G with respect to neo-additive capacities. Lets
denote a proﬁle of all players’ preferences by t ∈ Tn
G. Let G(t) be the strategic game played
when t is the proﬁle of players’ preferences in the game form hN,Ai of the strategic game
G = hN,A,πi. Further, let E(G(t)) be the set of pure strategy equilibria given the game G(t).
Since the set of preferences may not be well-deﬁned, the equilibrium notion may not be well-
deﬁned either. The only requirement we have is that for all Choquet expected utility players
with neo-additive capacities, inequality (10) of Deﬁnition 7 holds for any equilibrium. This
implies that if all players are Choquet expected utility maximizers with neo-additive capacities,
then an equilibrium is deﬁned in Deﬁnition 7. It also implies that if all players are Expected
utility maximizers, then an equilibrium is deﬁned by Nash equilibrium. We restrict the set of
abstract equilibria further by focusing on intra-group symmetric equilibria deﬁned by
Esym(G(t)) := {a(t) ∈ E(G(t))|ti = tj implies ai(t) = aj(t)}.
14This is the set of equilibria in which players with the same preference play also the same action.
Since for an abstract set of preferences, existence of such equilibria can not be guarantied, we
assume Esym(G(t)) 6= ∅ for all t ∈ Tn
G. A diﬀerent interpretation is that we consider only
preferences TG for which such equilibria can be deﬁned and exist.
As standard in the literature on evolution of preferences, each player i chooses according to
her ex-ante objective function indexed by ti. However, the player’s ﬁtness is evaluated by her
material payoﬀ πi. This conforms to ﬁtness considerations in business or academia. The success
of a manager (resp. assistant professor) is assessed by her realized proﬁt (resp. publications)
and not by what the manager (resp. assistant professor) originally expected.
In many economic contexts such as markets with imperfect competition etc., a ﬁnite number
of players interact repeatedly in an strategic context. For such environments, Schaﬀer (1988,
1989) introduced a notion of evolutionary stable strategy as an extension of the standard evo-
lutionary stable strategy for large populations to ﬁnite populations in which each player plays
against all other players (“playing-the-ﬁeld”). An action a ∈ A is a ﬁnite population evolution-
ary stable strategy (ESS) in a symmetric strategic game G = hN,A,πi if4
π(a,a0,a,...,a) ≥ π(a0,a,...,a) for all a0 ∈ A.
We will apply Schaﬀer’s notion of ﬁnite population ESS to the evolution of preferences in
aggregative games. As convention we denote by j always the mutant and by i 6= j a non-
mutant.
Deﬁnition 8 (ESP) t ∈ TG is a Finite Population Evolutionary Stable Preference (ESP) in











A ﬁnite population evolutionary stable preference t ∈ TG is robust (RESP) in a symmet-




A ﬁnite population evolutionary stable preference t ∈ TG is globally stable (GESP) in a
symmetric aggregative game G if for all mutants t0 ∈ TG,
π(a∗
i(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t),ℵn(a∗(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t))) ≥ π(a∗
j(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t),ℵn(a∗(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t))),(13)
for an a∗(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t) ∈ Esym(G(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t)) for all m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
A ﬁnite population evolutionary stable preference t ∈ TG that is robust globally stable in a
symmetric aggregative game G if for all mutants t0 ∈ TG inequality (13) holds for all a∗(t0, m ...
,t0,t,...,t) ∈ Esym(G(t0, m ...,t0,t,...,t)) for all m ∈ {1,...,n − 1}.
We say that complete ignorance is an evolutionary stable preference in G if there is an ti =
ui(αi,δi) with δi = 1 that is an evolutionary stable preference in G. That is, the evolutionary
4π(a,a
0,a,...,a) denotes the payoﬀ of a player playing a when one opponent plays a
0 and all other opponents
play each a.
15stable preference satisﬁes the Hurwicz criterion and involves complete ignorance. Likewise for
(robust) globally stable preferences.
We say that a preference with optimism (pessimism) and complete ignorance is evolution-
ary stable in G if t = u(α,δ) with δ = 1 and α ≥ max(min){α0 ∈ [0,1]|a((α0),(1,...,1)) ∈
Esym(G((α0),(1,...,1)) ∩ Esym(G)} is an evolutionary stable preference in G. I.e., if the pref-
erence with complete ignorance involves a higher degree of optimism as any symmetric pref-
erence proﬁle with complete ignorance that would lead to a symmetric Nash equilibrium in
G. This resembles the intuition that a preference leading to Nash equilibrium can not be
behaviorally distinguished from a realist. Note that max(min){α0 ∈ [0,1]|a((α0),(1,...,1)) ∈
Esym(G((α0),(1,...,1)) ∩ Esym(G)} is nonempty if for any symmetric Nash equilibrium a ∈ An
of the game G there exist a symmetric equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty a((α),(δ)) of G
with δ = 1 for all players such that a = a((α),(δ)). Otherwise, the property might be trivially
satisﬁed.
We say that a preference with extreme optimism (resp. pessimism) and complete ignorance
is evolutionary stable in G if t = (α,δ) with α = 1 (resp. α = 0) and δ = 1 is an evolutionary
stable preference in G.
Assumption 1 For any symmetric ATS proﬁle a ∈ An of the game G let there exist a sym-
metric equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty a((α),(δ)) of G with δi = 1 for all i ∈ N such
that a = a((α),(δ)).
For any symmetric optimal aggregate taking strategy, there should exist a capacity that satisﬁes
the Hurwicz criterion such that every player maximizing individually her Choquet expected
payoﬀs with respect to this capacity leads to an equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty that
equals to the optimal aggregate taking strategy.
Note that given aggregate (positive or negative) externalities, the assumption is essentially
an interior condition. The Hurwicz expectation is a weighted average of the best and worst
outcome corresponding to the largest (lowest) aggregate of actions. The assumption says that
the ATS lies somewhere between the best and worst outcome, i.e., the largest and lowest
outcome. The assumption is violated if for example there exists an action that dominates
any other action, and the aggregate taking strategy is diﬀerent from the Nash equilibrium.
Then clearly for any aggregate of opponents’ actions, the dominant action would be the best-
response to any opponents’ actions. This is then also the Nash equlibrium action as well as the
equilibrium action in any equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty since Knightian uncertainty
respects dominance. If we assume that the (dominant) Nash equilibrium action is diﬀerent from
any ATS, then there can not exist a best-response equivalent to an ATS.
Proposition 7 Let G = hN,A,πi be a symmetric strict submodular aggregative game with
aggregate externalities and TG be a collection of preferences that includes Hurwicz preferences.
Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and that a symmetric ATS exists. Then we conclude the
following:
(i) There exists a preference with optimism and complete ignorance (a Hurwicz preference)
that is globally evolutionary stable in G.
(ii) A symmetric equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty resulting from play with this evo-
lutionary stable preference proﬁle equals to a symmetric ATS proﬁle.
16(iii) If π is strictly concave in the player’s own action ai ∈ A for all a−i ∈ A−i, then there
exists a preference with optimism and complete ignorance (a Hurwicz preference) that is
a robust globally evolutionary stable preference.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
In Proposition 7, complete ignorance (and thus the Hurwicz criterion) together with op-
timism is a suﬃcient condition for the evolutionary stability of a preference. This poses the
question whether complete ignorance is also necessary. In Example 1 we present a standard
Cournot duopoly with linear demand and convex cost where complete ignorance and extreme
optimism is the unique preference with an equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty that equals
the ATS proﬁle and hence implies ESS. However, in Example 2 we show in a Cournot duopoly
with multiplicative aggregation that complete ignorance and thus the Hurwicz criterion is not
necessary for the evolutionary stability of a preference. Together Example 1 and 2 imply that
complete ignorance is a minimal suﬃcient condition in the sense that it applies to all aggregative
strict submodular games satisfying the assumptions of Proposition 7. Note that complete igno-
rance allows us to use arguments of Proposition 6, i.e., a result on the monotone comparative
statics of equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty for submodular games with externalities.
Otherwise changes in equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty may be ambiguous. Hence, it
appears that a full characterization of all evolutionary stable degrees of ignorance and optimism
is impossible with this general approach.
Example 1 (Cournot duopoly with linear demand and convex cost) Consider two
players, i = 1,2, and symmetric payoﬀ functions π(a1,a2) = (100 − a1 − a2)a1 − 1
2a2
1 with
actions ai being in a suitable positive real-valued interval. This is a standard Cournot duopoly
with linear demand and quadratic cost. It has decreasing diﬀerences and negative aggregate
externalities. There exists a unique Nash equilibrium as well as ATS. In this standard game,
the only degree of ignorance and optimism for which the EKU equals the ATS proﬁle is com-
plete ignorance and extreme optimism, i.e., δi = 1 and αi = 1. Any lower degree of ignorance
would require a larger degree of optimism, which is impossible. Since for class of games under
consideration, ATS implies ESS (Schipper, 2003, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005), and an EKU cor-
responding to the ATS involved complete ignorance, we can conclude that extreme optimism
and complete ignorance is an GESP.
Example 2 (Cournot duopoly with multiplicative aggregate) This example is to show
that complete ignorance is not necessary in Proposition 7. Consider two players, i = 1,2, and
symmetric payoﬀ functions π(a1,a2) = (100−a1a2)a1 − 1
2a2
1 with actions ai being in a suitable
positive real-valued interval. This game resembles a Cournot duopoly with a multiplicative
aggregate of actions. It has decreasing diﬀerences and negative aggregate externalities. There
exists a unique Nash equilibrium and ATS. One can compute that δi = 1 and αi = 0.95244 leads
to a unique EKU that equals the ATS. Thus Assumption 1 holds. Since it involves complete
ignorance, this is suﬃcient to conclude that (δi,αi) is an GESP. Are there other combinations
of δi and αi that are ESP? A simple (albeit ineﬃcient) way of searching for it is to compute all
preferences for which an EKU equals to an ATS, and check whether those players can not be
made worse oﬀ by mutants in equilibrium. Following ﬁgure presents a plot of all combinations
for which the EKU equals an ATS proﬁle if δi < 1. It can be veriﬁed that indeed there are
17Figure 1: Degrees of optimism and ignorance leading to ATS in Example 2
evolutionary stable preference without complete ignorance, for instance δi = 1
2 and αi = 1.
Note that there appears to be a negative relationship between the degree of ignorance and the
degree of optimism at least for some range of those parameters.
Supermodular games have often multiple equilibria. The following assumption guarantees
that there are at least two equilibria in pure strategies if maxA 6= minA, i.e., if the set of actions
is nontrivial. In particular, the largest and the lowest proﬁle of actions are Nash equilibria.
Assumption 2 Let πi(ai,inf A−i) be decreasing in ai ∈ A and πi(ai,supA−i) be increasing in
ai ∈ A.
Note that by Milgrom and Roberts (1990, Theorem 5), for any supermodular game there
exist both a largest and smallest proﬁle of actions that survive iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies, and those combinations of actions are pure Nash equilibria. It is known
that only iteratively undominated actions are rationalizable. Assumption 2 can be interpreted
as focusing on the subset of actions that can not be eliminated by iterated elimination of strictly
dominated actions. It is immediate that if an action is strictly dominated then it can not be
an equilibrium action under Knightian uncertainty for any degree of optimism and ignorance.
However, the assumption is not without loss of generality because in general a player may still
take opponents’ strictly dominated actions into account for computing the worst or the best
case payoﬀ. In Example 4 we illustrate what may happen if Assumption 2 is violated.
18Proposition 8 Let G = hN,A,πi be a symmetric strict supermodular aggregative game with
aggregate externalities and TG a collection of preferences that includes the Minimax preference.
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then we conclude the following:
(i) The preference with extreme pessimism and complete ignorance (the Minimax preference)
is evolutionary stable in G.
(ii) A symmetric equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty resulting from play with this evo-
lutionary stable preference proﬁle equals to a symmetric ATS.
(iii) If π is strictly quasi-concave in the player’s own action ai ∈ A for all a−i ∈ A−i, then the
preference with extreme pessimism and complete ignorance (the Minimax preference) is a
robust evolutionary stable preference.
The proof is contained in the appendix.
Contrary to Proposition 7, we can not show the global stability for supermodular games.
If our proof of the proposition should go through also for global stability, we would need to
show that the lower (largest) Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if the supermodular game has
positive (negative) externalities. This is not necessarily case. In contrast, one can show that
the largest (lowest) Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof if the game with ordered action space
has positive (negative) externalities (Lemma 7 in the appendix).
In order to show that complete ignorance and extreme pessimism is a robust evolutionary
stable preference, we require that π is just strictly quasi-concave in the player’s own action
ai instead of being strictly concave as in Proposition 7. This is due to extreme pessimism
and complete ignorance, such that the Choquet expected payoﬀ is equivalent to the worst-case
payoﬀ only. Contrary, in Proposition 7 the Choquet expected payoﬀ is a weighted average of the
worst and the best-case payoﬀ. It is well known that a weighted average of two quasi-concave
functions does not need to be quasi-concave.
The following example demonstrates that complete ignorance is not necessary for an evolu-
tionary stable preference in the class of games considered in Proposition 8.
Example 3 (Public goods game with multiple Nash equilibria) Consider two players,
i = 1,2, and symmetric payoﬀ functions π(a1,a2) = 1
4(a1 + a2)2 − 1
2a1 with actions ai ∈ [0,1].
This game resembles a public goods game with increasing returns to contribution. Clearly this
game has increasing diﬀerences and positive aggregate externalities. Since the beneﬁt function
1
4(a1 +a2)2 is convex in contributions, the only symmetric combinations of actions correspond-
ing to a pure Nash equilibrium are (0,0) and (1,1). Thus Assumption 2 holds. It can be
veriﬁed that ai = 0 is the unique ﬁnite population ESS and by the arguments in the proof of
Proposition 8 an ATS (see also Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). The corresponding ATS proﬁle
equals to an EKU with complete ignorance and extreme pessimism. Since this equilibrium
involves complete ignorance, a non-mutant can not be made worse of by any mutant because
ai = 0 is an ESS and she does not react to a mutant. However, there is a whole range of
parameters (δi,αi) for which the best response is ai = 0 no matter which action a mutant may
choose. These parameters are characterized by αi ∈ [0, 1
2] and δi ∈ [ 1
2(1−αi),1]. Hence complete
ignorance is not necessary for an evolutionary stable preference.
19The next example demonstrates what happens if Assumptions 1 and 2 do not hold. It also
demonstrates that an ESP may not exist within the class of CEU preferences. In particular,
if the game is supermodular and has a unique equilibrium, then there may not exist an evolu-
tionary stable CEU preference.
Example 4 (Public goods game with a dominant action) Consider two players, i = 1,2,
and symmetric payoﬀ functions π(a1,a2) = (a1+a2)2−a1 with actions ai ∈ [,1] and 0 <  < 1.
This game is a variant of the previous example. However, it possesses a unique strict dominant
action ai = 1. Note that Knightian uncertainty respects dominance, i.e., if an action is strictly
dominated, then it is never an equilibrium action under Knightian uncertainty. Thus any
symmetric equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty must be (1,1) no matter which degree of
optimism and degree of ignorance. However, (1,1) is never a ﬁnite population ESS since an
opponent can make a player relatively worse oﬀ then herself by deviating to action . Hence,
there is no evolutionary stable preference within the class of CEU preferences. It is straight
forward to establish that ai =  is the unique ﬁnite population ESS, and thus by arguments in
the proof of Proposition 8,  is an ATS (see also Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005). This example
violates Assumption 1 since there exists no proﬁle of preferences within the class of CEU
with neo-additive capacities such that the EKU resulting from this preference equals the ATS
proﬁle. It also violates Assumption 2 since πi(ai,inf A−i) is strictly increasing in ai ∈ A and
not decreasing. From a more general point of view, the example also demonstrates that there
is no apparent connection between the unique and strict dominant Nash equilibrium and ﬁnite
population ESS (as well as no apparent connection between eﬃciency and ﬁnite population
ESS).
6 Concluding Discussion
a. Evolutionary Stable Preferences and Evolutionary Drift: It is immediate that given the
abstract set of preferences, the inequalities deﬁning (robust globally) evolutionary stable pref-
erences may not hold strictly. There may be many other preferences that achieve the same
ﬁtness. Hence, our notion of (robust globally) evolutionary stable preference does not preclude
evolutionary drift among preferences achieving the same ﬁtness. In this sense, our notion of
evolutionary stable preferences is a much closer analogy to the notion of neutrally stable strate-
gies than to the standard notion of evolutionary stable strategies. However, any preference
taking over the population by evolutionary drift would be behaviorally indistinguishable from
the behavior of a homogenous population with the evolutionary stable preference in our re-
sults. To avoid evolutionary drift, speciﬁc assumptions on the collection of preferences would
be required.
b. Strategic Advantage - An Interpretation as Contest: Instead on focusing on the evolu-
tionary interpretation of the results, the present study may be interpreted as analyzing contests
or tournaments among players in which one may have a diﬀerent preference than others. A
player with an evolutionary stable preference maximizes relative payoﬀs, i.e., t is an ESP of the










20An ESP maximizes relative payoﬀs, a player deviating to an ESP may decrease her own equi-
librium payoﬀ but decreases the equilibrium payoﬀ of others even more.
Consider now two preferences t and t0. Partition the set of players N into two sets Nt
and Nt0. All players in Nt have preference t and analogously for Nt0. Preference t yields
a strategic advantage over preference t0 if at each equilibrium a∗ ∈ An of the game G =
hN,A,(ti)i∈Nt,(t0
j)j∈Nt0i we have
πi(a∗) ≥ πj(a∗) for all (i,j) ∈ Nt × Nt0
with strict inequality for some (i,j) ∈ Nt ×Nt0 (see Ko¸ ckesen, Ok and Sethi, 2000a, b). In our
case, a preference yielding a strategic advantage is a strict robust globally evolutionary stable
preference (that would exclude evolutionary drift as discussed above). Suppose we restrict TG
suitably in a non-trivial way such to exclude the possibility of evolutionary drift. Then our
result on symmetric aggregative submodular games with aggregate externalities implies that
optimism and complete ignorance yields a strategic advantage over other preferences in the set
TG. Similarly, if Nt0 is a singleton, then our result on symmetric aggregative supermodular
games with aggregate externalities implies that extreme pessimism and complete ignorance
yields and strategic advantage over other preferences in the set TG.
c. Observability of Preferences: It has been noted in the literature on the evolution of
preferences that the commitment eﬀect of preferences vanishes if preferences are not perfectly
observable (e.g., Samuelson, 2001, Ok and Vega-Redondo, 2001, Ely and Yilankaya, 2001, Dekel,
Ely and Yilankaya, 2004). Does this critique apply to our setting as well? No, it does not.
First, we show that a preference with complete ignorance is evolutionary stable. Thus, an action
by player with this evolutionary stable preference does not depend on the observability of the
opponents’ actions or preferences. Second, in the proofs of Proposition 7 and 8 we consider
any actions by any mutants without the need of specifying whether their preferences entail
a technology to observe opponents’ preferences or not. So the assumption of observability of
preferences does not play any role for our results. With a diﬀerent approach, Heifetz, Shannon
and Spiegel (2005) also show that payoﬀ maximizing behavior may not need to prevail even if
preferences are imperfectly observable.
d. The Relationship between Evolutionary Stable Strategy and optimal Aggregate Taking
Strategy: The proof of Proposition 7 relies heavily on the observation that in aggregate (quasi-
)submodular games ATS implies globally stable ESS (see Schipper, 2003, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania,
2005), and that ESS implies ATS for aggregate (quasi-)supermodular games (Al´ os-Ferrer and
Ania, 2005).
e. Evolutionary Dynamics: So far, we just considered a static concept of evolutionary stabil-
ity and were silent on any dynamic process of preference evolution. Only few authors considered
explicitly the dynamics of preference evolution (Huck, Kirchsteiger and Oechssler, 2005, Sand-
holm, 2001, Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel, 2004, and Possajennikov, 2005). A dynamic analysis
in our setting should consider beside the preference dynamics also a faster learning process for
equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty. Unfortunately, no learning process for equilibrium
under Knightian uncertainty has been proposed. Leaving this conceptional issue aside, we can
propose a process of preference adaption based on imitate-the-best. In reality, testimonies of
(un-)successful people educate us in some situations on “think positive” or “be careful” even
though this education may not be conscious. Hence it may not be unreasonable to assume
that attitudes towards uncertainty may be imitated. Consider following model of imitation a
21l` a Vega-Redondo (1997): In each period every player has a strict positive probability bounded
away from one to adjust her preference. If a player adjusts, then she mimics the preference of
the most successful player in the previous round (note that in contrast to above discussion this
imitation process requires that success and preferences are observable). For simplicity consider
a ﬁnite set of preferences that at least entails complete ignorance and “relevant” degrees of
optimism. The imitation dynamics induces a discrete time ﬁnite Markov chain on the space of
preference proﬁles. Focusing on intra-group symmetric equilibria it can be shown that the set
of absorbing sets includes each identical preference proﬁle. If we assume that each player may
make mistakes in imitating preferences (noise), i.e., with a small probability she selects any
preference proﬁle when adjusting her preference, then the resulting perturbed Markov chain
is ergodic and irreducible. We can now focus on the unique limiting invariant distribution of
preferences when the noise goes to zero. This is the long run distribution interpreted as the av-
erage proportion of time a player selects each preference (for an exposition of this methodology,
see Samuelson, 1997). For aggregative strict submodular games with aggregate externalities we
conjecture based on results by Schipper (2003) and arguments in the proof of Proposition 7,
that the evolutionary stable preference with complete ignorance and optimism is in the support
of long run distribution, i.e., “stochastically stable”. Similarly, for aggregative strict supermod-
ular games with aggregate externalities, we conjecture that the evolutionary stable preference
with complete ignorance and extreme pessimism is in the support of the long run distribution.
f. Short Run Industry Dynamics: While evolutionary stability focuses on long run outcomes,
in the short run interesting dynamics of proﬁts can arise. Consider a standard Cournot oligopoly
and assume that all ﬁrms choose individually optimal according to the evolutionary stable
preference which involves complete ignorance and optimism. Suppose now that there is a
mutant who is a realist. A realist improves his proﬁt compared to his pre-mutant proﬁt before
because she plays a best-response to the opponents’ quantities. However, she raises the proﬁts
of the opponents’ even more. Before the realistic mutant is driven out in the medium run, all
earn higher proﬁts, which may attract entry by additional ﬁrms.
g. Strategic Delegation and Optimism: In Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2005), we show
among others that a principal prefers to delegate to an optimistic manager in both Cournot
and Bertrand oligopoly. This is surprising since results are usually reversed when one goes
from standard Cournot to standard Bertrand oligopoly. The reason for our results is that an
optimistic manager in Cournot oligopoly is more aggressive and less expensive, while she is less
aggressive and less expensive in Bertrand oligopoly. From our analysis in this article is clear
that a principal delegating to an optimistic manager in a supermodular Bertrand oligopoly may
not survive. Since the manager is less aggressive, the ﬁrm may make less material payoﬀs then
a competitor with more pessimistic manager. This is in contrast to Cournot oligopoly, in which
the optimistic manager survives.
h. Applications: The results in the previous sections concern just a special class of games
which are however of substantial interest to economics and social science in general. Many
games in economics involve ordered action sets like prices, quantities, qualities, contribution
levels, appropriation levels etc. Often there is a natural aggregate of all players actions like total
market quantity, total contribution or appropriation etc. or an aggregate can be found that
may not have an interpretation in the context (for games with aggregation see see Corch´ on,
1994, Schipper, 2003, Al´ os-Ferrer and Ania, 2005, Cornes and Hartley, 2005). Moreover, many
games with ordered action space have either some version of strategic substitutes or strategic
22complements (see Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer, 1985) and can be brought into a frame-
work of supermodular or submodular games. Examples include Cournot oligopoly (Amir, 1996,
Vives, 2000), some Bertrand oligopoly (Vives, 2000), common pool resource dilemma (Walker,
Gardner, and Ostrom, 1990), some rent seeking games (Hehenkamp, Leininger and Possajen-
nikov, 2004), some bargaining games, some public goods games, some co-ordination games (e.g.
Van Hyuck, Battalio and Beil, 1991), arms race and search problems (Milgrom and Roberts,
1990).
i. Equilibrium under Knightian Uncertainty: We claimed in section 3 that our notion of
equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty implies some equilibrium notions proposed in the
literature on ambiguity in strategic games. Consider a general capacity νi for player i on the
opponents’ action space Ai and let suppνi denote the Dow-Werlang support of the capacity, i.e.,
a set suppνi ⊆ A−i with νi(A−i\suppνi) = 0 and νi(F) > 0 for all F such that A−i\suppνi $ F.
An equilibrium under ambiguity of a ﬁnite strategic game G is a proﬁle of capacities (ν∗
i )i=N
such that for all i ∈ N there exists a non-empty support suppν∗
i for which
suppν∗





where the integral is the Choquet integral. In the two-player case, this is the deﬁnition of
Dow and Werlang (1994) and in the n-player case the one by Eichberger and Kelsey (2000).
Marinacci (2000) introduced a similar deﬁnition of equilibrium under ambiguity for two-player
strategic games in which he deﬁnes the support of a capacity νi by the set of all a−i ∈ A−i with
νi(a−i) > 0. For neo-additive capacities (Deﬁnition 5) used in our study, the Dow-Werlang
support and the Marinacci support coincide with the support of the probability distribution µi.
In Eichberger, Kelsey and Schipper (2005), Proposition 3.1, we show for neo-additive capacities
that any equilibrium under Knightian uncertainty implies an equilibrium a l` a Eichberger and
Kelsey (2000), Dow and Werlang (1994) or Marinacci (2000).
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1















for all i ∈ N. Consider case (i), and let G have strict negative aggregate externalities. Suppose to the
contrary that for i ∈ N we have a◦
i C a∗





























which is a contradiction to inequality (14). The case for strict positive externalities follows analogously.
23Now consider case (ii). Again, suppose to the contrary that for i ∈ N we have a◦
i C a∗
i. By the dual




























which is a contradiction to inequality (14). The case for positive externalities follows analogously. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
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By Remark 1 it follows that if πi has [decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and negative (resp. posi-
tive) externalities] or [increasing diﬀerences in (ai,a−i) on An and positive (resp. negative) externalities],
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Consider any δi ∈ [0,1]. Then previous inequality implies
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The proof holds analogously for strict versions. 
A.3 Proof of Lemma 6
Pick any α00
i and α0
i in [0,1] with α00
i > α0
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i ,δi) − ui(a00
i ,a−i,α00
i ,δi) ≤ 0, (29)
which yields a contradiction.
Second, consider strictly decreasing diﬀerences of ui in (ai,αi), and suppose to the contrary that
a0
iCa00
i . Then a0
iBa0
i∨a00
i and so using the hypothesis that ui(ai,a−i,αi,δi) is for any (a−i,δi) ∈ A−i×[0,1]
supermodular in ai and has strictly decreasing diﬀerences in (ai,αi),
0 ≤ ui(a00
i ,a−i,α00















i,δi) ≤ 0, (30)
which yields a contradiction. 
The second part of the proof above is analog to Topkis (1978) (see also Topkis, 1998, Theorem
2.8.4.).
A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
(i) First, we show that there exists a preference t◦ with complete ignorance leading to an EKU that
equals an ATS. By assumption, a symmetric ATS exists for G. We denote it by a◦. It follows from
Assumption 1 that there exists a preference t◦ = (δ◦,α◦) with δ◦ = 1 (and some α◦) such that there is
a symmetric Equilibrium under Knightian with a∗(t◦) = a◦.
Second, we show that t◦ is a globally stable ESP. In particular, we show that if the EKU a∗(t◦)
is a symmetric ATS then t◦ is a globally stable ESP in G. Consider the case of negative aggregate
externalities. Denote by t0 := (t0, m ...,t0,t◦,...,t◦) for some m s.t. 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 and t0 ∈ T. Recall that




for all t0 ∈ T. By Remark 3 all non-mutants have constant best-response selections. Therefore we can
select a∗(t0) ∈ Esym(G(t0)) such that a∗
i(t◦) = a∗
i(t0) for all non-mutants i and a∗
i(t◦) ≥ a∗
j(t0) for all




25Since we ﬁxed a∗(t0) ∈ Esym(G(t0)) such that a∗
i(t◦) = a∗




Since this holds for all m with 1 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 and all t0 ∈ T, we have that t◦ is a globally evolutionary
stable preference in G. The case of positive externalities follows analogously.
Third, we show that t◦ is optimistic. Since G has strict negative (positive) externalities we have
by Lemma 1, a◦ ≥ (≤)a∗. Assume for the time being that a◦ 6= a∗. We claim that α◦ ≥ α∗ where
α∗ = max{α0 ∈ [0,1]|a∗((α0),(1,...,1)) ∈ Esym(G((α0),(1,...,1)) ∩ Esym(G)}. Suppose to the contrary
that α◦ < α∗. Then by Proposition 6 we must have a∗(α◦) ≤ (≥)a∗(α∗). Since by assumption a∗(α◦) 6=
a∗(α∗) we have a contradiction. Hence α◦ ≥ α∗. If a◦ 6= a∗ then trivially there exists α◦ = α∗ by
Assumption 1. Hence t◦ is optimistic.
(ii) Follows immediately from previous arguments.
(iii) We note that if for all players π is strictly concave in the player’s own action ai on A for all
a−i on A−i, then so is ui since it is a sum of strictly concave functions, each term multiplied by positive
scalar, and because of aggregate externalities, the worst and best-case actions of the opponents do not
depend on the player’s own action. Hence b(a−i,ti) is a singleton for all i ∈ N, each a−i and each
ti. Thus, if δi = 1 we have by Remark 3 that b(a−i,αi) is a constant function on A−i for each αi.
Therefore for all non-mutants a∗
i(t◦) = a∗
i(t0) for all a∗(t0) ∈ Esym(G(t0)). Hence t◦ is a robust globally
evolutionary stable preference. This completes the proof of the proposition. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 8
Lemma 7 Suppose that the strategic game G = hN,A,πi has positive (resp. negative) externalities, and
let ¯ a and a be the greatest and least combination of actions in An. If a (resp. ¯ a) is a Nash equilibrium
of G then a (resp. ¯ a) is a ﬁnite population evolutionary stable strategy in G.
Proof of Lemma. If G has positive (resp. negative) externalities, let a := a (resp. a := ¯ a). Since ¯ a
is a Nash equilibrium of G,
π(a,...,a) ≥ π(a0,a,...,a) for all a0 ∈ A. (34)
We need to show that
π(a,a0,a,...,a) ≥ π(a0,a,...,a) for all a0 ∈ A. (35)
Given both inequalities, it is suﬃcient to show
π(a,a0,a,...,a) ≥ π(a,...,a) for all a0 ∈ A. (36)
But last inequality follows immediately from positive (resp. negative) externalities. 
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) and (ii): Suppose that the game has positive (negative) aggregate
externalities and consider the lowest (highest) symmetric proﬁle of actions a (¯ a). By Assumption 2 this
proﬁle of actions is a Nash equilibrium of the game G.
If G has positive (resp. negative) externalities, a := a (resp. a := ¯ a) is by Lemma 7 a ﬁnite
population evolutionary stable strategy in G.
We claim that a is an ATS. Since G is an aggregative game, we have by deﬁnition of ﬁnite population
ESS,
π(a,ℵn(a0,a,...,a)) ≥ π(a0,ℵn(a0,a,...,a)) for all a0 ∈ A. (37)
26By increasing diﬀerences, ﬁnite population ESS implies ATS,
π(a,ℵn(a,...,a)) ≥ π(a0,ℵn(a,...,a)) for all a0 ∈ A. (38)
By Assumption 1 there exists a preference t with δ = 1 such that a symmetric EKU satisﬁes
a∗(t) = a. Consider the preference t = (δ,α) with δ = 1 and α = 0. From Proposition 5 follows that a







j,t−j))) for all t0 ∈ T. (39)
By Remark 3 all non-mutants have constant best-response selections. Therefore we can select a∗(t0
j,t−j) ∈
Esym(G(t0
j,t−j)) such that a∗
i(t) = a∗
i(t0








j,t−j))) for all t0 ∈ T, (40)
i.e., t is an ESP in the game G.
(iii) We note that if π is strictly quasi-concave in the player’s own action ai on A for all a−i on
A−i, then ui(1,0) = z is strictly quasi-concave in the player’s own action ai on A. Hence b(a−i,(1,0))




j,t−j) for all equilibria a∗(t0
j,t−j) ∈ Esym(G(t0
j,t−j)). This completes the proof of
the proposition. 
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